To support Taiwan, one does NOT need to reject China (PRC), its global role and its hopefully bright future! Nonetheless, China is asking (really demanding with its "diplomatic theater") that the United States follow such an illogical twist in our policy. But it is a twist the United States must scrupulously avoid, if it is to have a stable policy in East Asia. Alas, some policy makers have accepted it. That choice is ill conceived and will scuttle our good intentions and ultimately our relations with both nations.

In the last 2 articles in this series about the December 1 (2001) legislative (Yuan) elections in which the Democratic Progressive party (DPP) replaced the long-ruling Nationalist party (KMT), I want to share some observations first on U.S./Chinese (PRC) relations. And in the last article I will share some final observations on U.S./Taiwan relations.

First to China. Without question, U.S./China relations are extremely important for reasons of trade, security and sheer size of the mainland's population. There is, however, a gulf growing, particularly in the United States, between those analysts and pundits who view mainland China as the most important focus for U.S. foreign policy and those who support Taiwan's independent development. Some even have called the 21st century "the Pacific Century" because of China's envisioned future. To this group Taiwan is an irritant and poses an unnecessary challenge, especially to the future of U.S./China trade relations. The other side points out Taiwan's solid credentials as a liberal democracy, the world's 14th largest economy and its technological sophistication. This group also points out the mainland's distorted statistics, which make China's growth and potential far less glamorous. During the Clinton years, U.S. foreign policy seemed heavily China-centric, as it does for Henry Kissinger and his satellites. George W. Bush, however, began almost in the opposite camp, calling China a "strategic competitor," despite his father's legacy. In any event, the growing gulf is both unproductive and dangerous.

In my view there is a third way for U.S. foreign policy, which serves both Taiwan's and the PRC's interests better. Put another way, for the United States to be a supporter of Taiwan, (pro Taiwan), it does not have to be anti-PRC. And notwithstanding the PRC's insistence and truculence, that position is not tenable! The PRC has sought to make all issues relating to Taiwan internal, domestic issues, but the United States has never given up its right to defend its own interests in the Pacific, or the commitments in the Taiwan Relations Act (1979) and subsequent enhancements. The mainland even argues the United States agreed to reduce arms sales to Taiwan (under Ronald Reagan). China's interpretation, however, is accepted by few analysts outside China and is non-sensical while observing China's own military buildup, which some see as a growing threat to the stability and security of U.S. interests in the Pacific, particularly through the sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) around East Asia.

Thus as a matter of strategy, the United States should treat China with great respect, but not a s a great power, which will only lead China to seek to fulfill an international role for which it is demonstrably unprepared. The April 1, 2000, clash between the ill-fated, Chinese fighter-jet and the U.S EP-3 reconnaissance plane, which made an emergency landing on Hainan Island, so clearly made that point. Someday China probably will be a great power. But the world will rue that day if China has not learned to live within the established norms of international comity.

As Gerald Segal fulsomely articulated in Foreign Affairs (Sept-Oct 1999), the data simply don't support calling China a "Great Power":

In 1997 China accounted for 3.5 percent of world GNP (in 1997 constant dollars, the United States was 25.6 percent). China ranked seventh in the world, ahead of Brazil and behind Italy. Its per capita GDP ranking was 81st, just ahead of Georgia and behind Papua, New Guinea. Taking the most favorable of the now-dubious purchasing-power-parity calculations, in 1997 China accounted for 11.8 percent of world GNP, and is per capita ranking was 65, ahead of Jamaica and behind Latvia. Using the U.N. Human Development Index, China is 107th, bracketed by Albania and Namibia - not an impressive story... The Middle Kingdom, then, is merely a middle power.

I first traveled to the People's Republic of China in 1987, even before Jimmy Carter had signed the final documents "normalizing" relations with the United States. It was a splendid trip. The Chinese I encountered on that trip were as curious about Americans, as we were about them. And it was at a time when Deng Xiaoping was moving away from the atrocities of Mao's Cultural Revolution and opening up China to the world. Deng was abandoning Mao's hard-edged ideology for a gentler pragmatism. As he famously said, he didn't care if the cat were black or white, as long as it caught mice.

It was a halcyon time in U.S./China relations. On subsequent trips to the mainland, I have observed the changing panorama of our globe's most populous nation, as I prepared my classes in Chinese politics: its educational system, the Party (CCP), the Red Army, Chinese culture, and, yes, human rights and religious freedoms.

Based on those trips and study, I believe the United States can be optimistic about China's future without for a moment conceding the same optimism for Taiwan's future...and supporting it. Of course, as the fable goes, Taiwan's people may some day willingly accede to China's overtures and "reunite" with the communist mainland. But no one really believes that. And why should they? Taiwan is democratic; it has had great economic success through hard work and sacrifice. It has also experienced the crushing yoke of authoritarianism; acceding to the mainland's threats will never voluntarily happen. For Taiwan joining the mainland is a backward, debilitating step, and everyone knows it, inside Taiwan and out.

So what should U.S. policy towards China be? First, treat the Middle Kingdom as the middle power they are in order not to feed raw aspirations. Second, end the policy of "strategic ambiguity." Keeping China (and Taiwan) unsure about U. S. intentions in the Taiwan Strait nurtures the very insecurity we seek to avoid. China becomes more emboldened and offensively armed, and Taiwan becomes more defensively fortified. That is a bleak future, indeed, and ultimately unsustainable. Third, end the (wink of the eye) "one China" policy.

Some believe those changes in policy will cause China to cross swords with the United States. I believe if we don't change our policies, we could fuel the prospect for conflict. By most accounts, including the government's, Taiwan will not be conquered by Chinese military force. The horror is that China might be tempted to undertake an invasion, thinking the United States would not intervene, or that the Taiwanese would not seek to repel it. Both results are possible; neither is likely. Diplomatic conflict in the near term is a small price to avoid military conflict in future years.